Whether a propaganda effort is true is the very last thing that counts.
The already well-known Israeli order that all people in the northern Gaza Strip must leave has been referred to by the Hamas Authority for Refugee Affairs as “false propaganda.”
Whoever published this is completely incorrect and most definitely was not engaged in the preparation of the military invasion that the Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the Palestinian organization, carried out in Israel last week. Whether a propaganda effort is true is the very last thing that counts.
The death and capture of Israeli military personnel and residents in settlements under the siege of Hamas militants are only a few of the spectacular breaches of the security barriers separating Israel and Gaza that were carried out in a very deliberate and effective way.
Nevertheless, the attack’s primary goal was not military, with the possible exception of taking a small number of captives who may serve as human shields in the event that Israel carried out violent retaliation on the ground. The actual motivation for the assault was Hamas’s desire to show off its military might and readiness to commit extreme violence.
The action plan was created as a statement that said, “This is what we can and will accomplish.” As such, it fits under the crucial, even crucial, category of the art of war known as psychological warfare.
This term could be fresh… While it was originally used at the start of World War II, only around 80 years ago, the behaviour’s it portrays are as ancient as both the conflict and mankind.
Military leaders have known since the dawn of time that they had a higher chance of winning a war if their adversary was weakened and demoralized by dread and uncertainty.
Ancient warrior kings understood that one of the best military strategies is surprise. You’ve already won half the war if you let your adversaries predict when and how you’ll strike, especially if you let them anticipate you in a different location at a different time. By surprising your adversary and assaulting him when he least expects it, you can win the remaining battle.
There have been many wars in the past that were won without a key engagement. John McCain, a US senator and former military officer in the Vietnam War, said that General V Nguyen Gap, the Vietnamese commander-in-chief, never actually won the war. In this sense, Hamas won the battle against Israel over the weekend, but it did not win the war. Yet, it scored a major propaganda win.
Israelis as well as a large portion of the Western world were outraged when they saw footage of Hamas firing machine guns against Israelis, both troops and civilians. However, in the eyes of many Palestinians, a large portion of the rest of the Arab world, and many Third World nations, the armed fighters demonstrated tenacity, steely nerves, skill in the use of contemporary military technologies, and complete disregard for their own lives in an action that would have cost them their lives. This demonstrated Dalits’ capacity to successfully oppose the hegemony of wealthy and powerful individuals. Hamas achieved a big propaganda win in that wide region of the world.
It took the axe to its feet in Israel and the West, providing more proof for people who view Hamas forces as ruthless murders and “terrorists.” Also, it brought Israelis together who bonded together despite having divergent political views.
Was Hamas aware of the consequences of the raid? Certainly, but it’s obvious that they believe it will be worthwhile to present themselves in a different light and rekindle interest in the predicament of the Palestinians.
According to expectations, Israel’s reaction consisted of a premeditated aerial assault of Gaza with questionable military ramifications followed by an instant psychological warfare effort. Guns and propaganda: a tried-and-true military tactic.
Israel’s demand that residents of northern Gaza leave within 24 hours is merely war propaganda. Every military strategist is aware that even in the face of the greatest threat, civilians reject attempts to impose order, resist attempts to punish them, attempt to seize assets that slow them down, strive to find alternate means of achieving their goals, etc. Just 20–25 kilometres (12.5–15.5 miles) may be travelled in a day.
Yet, when their numbers increase—even to 10,000, let alone 10,000—they will obstruct all roads, even those used by the army for manoeuvres, causing chaos, fear, and demoralization.
Israel sought to do this specifically, although it was only partially successful. Why? Tomorrow, we’ll analyse it.
I want to add that my prediction that Israel wouldn’t attack Gaza on Friday night came true. Even now, I don’t believe that will take place.
I won’t rule it out for the weekend after next, though. The Israeli military may be able to reach its intended level of operational preparedness at this point in time.
